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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
* 
Plaintiff Appellee, * 
* 
v. * Priority No. 2 
* 
CYNTHIA R. ROBLEY, * Case No. 970453-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. * 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a sentence imposed after the Defendant plead guilty in the Second 
District Court of Weber County to one count of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class A 
Misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44 (1953, As Amended). 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A § 78-2-2(3)(I) (1953, as amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I - The Defendant Was Denied Her Right to Due Process of Law as Guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Utah When the Trial Court Refused to 
Continue Her Sentencing to Allow Her Attorney to Be Present. 
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Standard of Review 
Constitutional issues are a question of law. The trial court's determination of questions of 
law are given no deference and are reviewed on appeal for correctness. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1993). 
POINT II ~ The Defendant Was Denied Her Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of 
Counsel When Her Court Appointed Attorney Failed to Appear and Failed to Call Witnesses on Her 
Behalf at Her Sentencing Hearing. 
Standard of Review 
Where ineffective assistance of Counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, the Appellate 
Court must determine as a matter of law whether the Defendant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel. State v. Callahan 866 P 2d 590 (Utah App 1993) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. STATUES AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIVr Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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Utah State Constitution, Article 1. Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah State Constitution. Article 1, Sec. 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by 
statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by 
statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at 
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed 
as defined by statute or rule. 
U.C.A. §77-18-l(6)(7) 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the pre-sentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, 
or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three 
working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the pre-sentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, 
shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the 
department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall 
make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record, 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the pre-sentence investigation report at the time 
of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the 
defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. 
This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on record and in the 
presence of the defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a sentence imposed after the defendant plead guilty to one count of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-44 
(1953, As Amended). On July 1, 1997, the Defendant, Cynthia R. Robley, was sentenced to serve 
a term of one year in the Weber County Jail The trial court also ordered the sentence to run 
concurrent to the term she was already serving, but did allow her "statutory good time". 
Ms. Robley appeals her sentence based upon the fact that she was denied her right to due 
process of law and effective assistance of counsel when: (1) her attorney failed to appear for her 
sentencing hearing, (2) her attorney failed to call the witnesses she gave him, and (3) when the trial 
court refused to continue the hearing to afford her effective representation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. Robley was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and driving on a revoked 
drivers license. Martin V. Gravis of the Weber County Public Defender Association was appointed 
to represent Ms. Robley on the charges. On May 20, 1997,Ms. Robley appeared before the 
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan, Judge of the Second Judicial District. Upon the advice of Mr. 
Gravis, she entered a plea of guilty to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol, a class A 
misdemeanor. In exchange for her plea of guilty, the State dismissed the driving on a revoked drivers 
license charge currently pending against Ms. Robley. The trial court ordered Ms. Robley to report 
to Adult Probation and Parole for the purpose of conducting a Pre-sentence Investigation Report and 
set the matter for sentencing on June 24, 1997. (R. 2-3) 
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On June 24, 1997, John T. Caine, also of the Weber County Public Defender Association, 
appeared with Ms. Robley for sentencing. At that time, Ms. Robley advised Mr. Caine that she 
disputed some of the information contained in the Pre-sentence Investigation report and requested 
that a sentencing hearing be set to allow her to respond to the report. Mr. Caine requested a hearing, 
and a hearing was set for July 1, 1997 at 1:30 p.m. (R. 4) 
Ms. Robley appeared for her sentencing hearing on July 1, 1997; however, neither Martin 
Gravis nor John Caine appeared at the sentencing hearing. The State subpoenaed witnesses to testify 
at the hearing; however, no witnesses appeared to testify on Ms. Robley's behalf. The Court excused 
all of the State's witnesses when defense counsel failed to appear, but refused to reschedule the 
hearing to allow Defendant's counsel to be present. 
Instead of rescheduling the hearing, Judge Heffernan requested that Michael Boyle, also of 
the Weber County Public Defender Association, act as counsel for the Defendant for the purposes 
of sentencing. Although Mr. Boyle was given a moment to go over the Pre-sentence Investigation 
Report with the Defendant, he was not able to call any Defense witnesses. 
Judge Heffernan sentenced the Defendant to a term of one year in the Weber County Jail to 
be run consecutively to the sentence she was already serving. (R. 13) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's right to Due Process as provided for in the United States Constitution and 
the Constitution of Utah were violated when the trial court failed to grant a continuance of the 
Defendant's sentencing. The Defendant's trial attorney failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, 
which was specifically set by defense counsel. He failed to call the witnesses Ms. Robley gave 
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counsel. By forcing the Defendant to accept alternate counsel, the trial court infringed upon the 
Defendant' s right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Ms. Robley was denied her right to effective assistance of counsel when her trial attorney 
failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, and failed to call witnesses to testify at the sentencing 
hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED 
STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS WHEN THE 
TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO CONTINUE 
SENTENCING TO ALLOW DEFENSE 
COUNSEL TO BE PRESENT 
It is well established that due process, as guaranteed by both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions, requires criminal proceedings to be conducted to insure that the decision-making 
process is based upon accurate and reasonably reliable information. State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 
1071 (Utah 1993V State v.Howell. 707P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); State v. Lipsky. 608 P.2d 1241, 
1248 (Utah 1980). It is undisputed that the sentencing phase is a critical part of a criminal 
proceeding, and a defendant is entitled to due process protections during sentencing to prevent 
procedural unfairness. State v. Bell. 754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988); State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 
1007 (Utah 1982). 
Furthermore, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel when a trial court imposes 
a criminal sentence. Mempa v. Rhay. 389 U.S. 128, 135, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336, 88 S. Ct. 254 (1967); 
State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) 
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Fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant have the 
right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon which his 
sentence is based. Lipsky. 608 P.2d at 1248; State v. Hanson. 627 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981); State 
v. Anderson. 632 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1981). 
In the case at bar, Ms. Robley was denied her right to due process as guaranteed under 
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution when the trial court refused to entertain a motion for continuance. Ms. Robley's trial 
attorney specifically requested a new sentencing hearing to afford her the right to call witnesses to 
refute the information contained in her pre-sentence report. However, instead of calling those 
witnesses, the attorney failed to subpoena even one witnesses, and he failed to appear himself. 
Martin Gravis and John T. Caine of the Weber County Public Defender Association both 
failed to provide Ms. Robley with any resemblance of effective assistance of counsel when they failed 
to call witnesses on her behalf and failed to appear with her at her sentencing hearing. Ms. Robley 
specifically requested a sentencing hearing to allow her the right to address the inaccuracies in her 
pre-sentence investigation report. At the request of John T. Caine, who was standing in for Martin 
V. Gravis, the trial court granted a continuance of the Defendant's sentencing to July 1, 1997 in an 
attempt to comply with U.C.A. §77-18-l(6)(7). 
However, on July 1, 1997, the trial court refused to continue the matter a second time. It was 
obvious from the record that the Defendant was denied her right to effective assistance of counsel 
and due process through no fault of her own. She was present for both hearings. Her ap\ed attorney, 
Martin V. Gravis, as well as the attorney who requested a continuance on her behalf, John T. Caine, 
failed to call any of the witnesses Ms. Robley gave them, and they failed to even appear at the 
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hearing. The trial court was well aware the Defendant contested the information contained in the pre-
sentence investigation report, and it had previously granted a continuance to afford Ms. Robley the 
opportunity to contest the report. Even after an attempt to locate the Defendant's attorney was 
unsuccessful, the trial court refused to continue the hearing. Instead the trial court ordered another 
unprepared public defender, already present in the courtroom, Michael J. Boyle, to stand in with Ms. 
Robley. The Defendant was already incarcerated, and; therefore posed absolutely no threat to the 
community or a threat of fleeing. And but for the costs of subpoenaing witnesses, the State would 
not have been prejudiced by an additional continuance. 
The Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of one year in the county jail to run 
consecutively with her previous sentence without the benefit of having witnesses called on her behalf. 
The trial court was concerned with the Defendant's ability to respond in a treatment center. The 
Defendant intended to call witnesses to testify on her behalf regarding her previous attempts at 
rehabilitation, and why they failed. Had the Defendant been given the opportunity to refute the 
contents of the PSI, she would have had a more favorable outcome at her sentencing. 
The transcript is replete with evidence that the Defendant was denied her right to due process 
as guaranteed by the United States and Utah Constitutions. The trial court incorrectly refused to 
grant a continuance necessary to insure Ms. Robley her constitutional rights. The trial court's failure 
to grant the continuance was clear error. Therefore Ms. Robley's sentence must be reversed and a 
new sentencing hearing set before another impartial judge. 
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POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHEN HER COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY FAILED 
TO APPEAR AT HER SENTENCING HEARING AND 
FAILED TO CALL WITNESSES ON HER BEHALF 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee persons charged 
with a criminal offense the right to effective assistance of counsel to assist in their defense. £eg U.S. 
Const. Amend. VI: U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Section 1; Utah Const. Art. 1. Section 7; Utah Const. 
Art. L Section 12; £§£ alsp. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. at 667 at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 
(1984); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (1990). The right to effective assistance of counsel applies 
to the sentencing phase in a criminal matter. Mempa v. Rhay. 389 U.S. 128, 135, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336, 
88 S. Ct. 254 (1967); State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005,1007 (Utah 1982). The Appellant was denied 
this constitutionally guaranteed right and, therefore, the trial court's sentence must be vacated and 
the case remanded for a new sentencing. 
To successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Appellant must show 
that (1) her counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) that there exists a reasonable 
probability that but for counsel's deficient conduct, the verdict would have been more favorable to 
the defendant. State v. Cummins. 829 P.2d 848 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 
186 (Utah 1990). 
There is no doubt that Mr. Gravis' and Mr. Caine's representation was objectively deficient. 
Although appointed to represent the Defendant, Mr. Gravis failed to appear at either of the 
sentencing hearings. Instead, he had Mr. Caine stand in on his behalf. Mr. Caine set a sentencing 
hearing on the Defendant's behalf, but he failed to call any of witnesses previously given to him by 
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Ms. Robley. Neither did^Mr. Gravis call the requested witnesses. And in fact, both attorneys failed 
to even appear with the Defendant at the specially set sentencing hearing on July 1, 1997. 
Failure of counsel to adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, including the 
availability of prospective defense witnesses, cannot fall within the 'wide range of professional 
assistance' referred to in Strickland. See State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). The first 
prong of the Strickland test is clearly supported by the record. 
Ms. Robley wanted her trial counsel to call several witnesses from some of the rehabilitation 
centers she had previously attended. She had told Mr. Caine that she wanted to call the witnesses 
to establish that her only problem with treatment in the past had been for financial reasons. 
The Defendant plead guilty to a Class A misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol. She expressed a desire to attend a rehabilitation center to overcome her alcohol problem. 
In denying her request for a rehabilitation center, the trial court expressed its concern regarding the 
defendant's failure to successfully complete her prior treatment. Had Mr. Caine or Mr. Gravis 
contacted and called the witnesses on her behalf, the trial court would have been aware that Ms. 
Robley's failures in the past was not for the lack of desire, but was simply because she was without 
the funds to pay for a private treatment program. Had the trail court been aware of Ms. Robley's 
prior attempts to overcome her addiction, it would have been more inclined to sentence the Defendant 
to a treatment center. 
It is obvious that Mr. Gravis and Mr. Caine were ineffective in their representation of Ms. 
Robley, and but for their ineffective representation, the Defendant would have received a more 
favorable outcome at her sentencing hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court violated the Defendant's right to due process when it failed to grant a 
continuance of her sentencing hearing. The Defendant was also denied her right to effective 
assistance of counsel. Through no fault of her own, Ms. Robley's attorneys failed to appear and 
failed to call even one witness on her behalf. The denial of the Defendant's right to due process and 
eflFective assistance of counsel cannot be said to be harmless. Wherefore, the Defendant's sentence 
must be vacated and this case remanded back to the District Court for sentencing before a new and 
impartial judge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /$ day of October, 1997. 
^ K e n t E ^ S ^ ^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to the following: 
Les Daroczi 
Deputy County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ADDENDUM 
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14 
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24 
25 
MR. GRAVIS: We can call number 10, Cynthia Robley. 
THE COURT: Has she been brought up? 
MR. GRAVIS: She is not in custody. She is here. 
THE CLERK: The State of Utah vs. Cynthia Robley, 
975001647. 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor, we have resolved this 
matter. She will plead to the Class A DUI. The State will 
dismiss the Driving on Revocation. 
THE COURT: Is that correct? 
MS. SJOGREN: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. If you plead guilty to the 
Class A Misdemeanor, you are giving up your right to the trial] 
in this case scheduled for the 2nd of June. Is that what you 
want to do today? 
MS. ROBLEY; Yes, your Honor, it is. 
THE COURT: If you admit that, it will automatically] 
go in your record as a conviction for a Class A Misdemeanor 
for DUI. It carries with it a fine of up to $2,500.00 and up 
to one year in jail is the maximum penalty. Do you understand] 
that? 
MS. ROBLEY: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: You have a right to have your attorney 
present throughout the proceedings. You have a right to 
require the State to prove you have actually committed the 
DUI, and that you have other offenses within six years, that 
2 
© 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
is two offenses within six years of this violation, which ups 
it to a Class A Misdemeanor. 
You have to require--as I indicated, you have a right to 
a Jury trial, which I believe it was scheduled for. The Jury 
would consist of six people. All six people on the Jury would 
have to be convinced unanimously of your guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt before you can be found guilty. 
Again, by pleading guilty, you are not requiring any of 
that to happen. Are you prepared to enter your plea today? 
MS. ROBLEY: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: How do you plead to the Class A 
Misdemeanor? 
MS. ROBLEY: Pleading guilty. 
THE COURT: The State is moving to dismiss the other) 
charge? 
MS. SJOGREN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Granted. It is a Class A. I think a 
pre-sentence would be appropriate. It would be June 24th at 
2:00 o'clock. 
MR. GRAVIS: That will be fine. 
THE COURT: It may be in the new building over here, 
other than this one. We are not exactly sure where we will 
be. You need to know where to go, okay? 
MS. ROBLEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
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(July 1, 1997) 
THE COURT: We have Cynthia Robley. A Public 
Defender, John Caine, asked for a sentencing hearing. I set 
it for 1:30 so we could hear testimony. And he is not here. 
I am ready to go ahead with sentencing. 
MR. BOYLE: I haven't talked to her. If we could 
pass that. Do you have some other matters we could do? 
THE COURT: But, I am not going to get into a re-
sentencing hearing later on. That was what we were going to 
do now. I think he has waived it now, if you want to handle 
the sentencing now. 
MR. BOYLE: John Caine was going to come over and 
handle the case, but he is not here. 
THE COURT: Well, we will see where we go. He may 
never show up. That's what they are doing these days. 
Go ahead and call the next case. 
(Case continued.) 
THE COURT: State vs. Cynthia Robley, case 
965001647. 
THE COURT: This is a case that John Caine requested) 
sentencing hearing on. It was specially set today at 1:30 at 
his request. He hasn't been here all afternoon. Mr. Miles, 
this is a PDA case. This was John Caine's case. He asked for) 
sentencing hearing. It was set for 1:30 today. Witnesses 
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were here. I excused them when he didn't show up. I am not 
going to continue it past today. It was set for sentencing 
today. There is no reason to set another hearing date. And 
this is something you will have to take up with John Caine. 
He had witnesses that sat here and sat here. And I am willing| 
to go ahead. 
MS. ROBLEY: Excuse me, your Honor, John Caine was 
not my attorney. Martin Gravis was. And he was in another 
session. And Mr. Caine was acting in his behalf. 
THE COURT: You are correct. 
MS. ROBLEY: And it was supposed to be a 1:30 
hearing regarding an A P & P report. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. Wasn't this set for John| 
Caine? He was here last time with you. He was the one that 
asked for the sentencing hearing. 
MS. ROBLEY: Well, when--he asked for the A P & P 
hearing. 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
MS. ROBLEY: Because I was disputing it. It was setl 
for 1:30 
THE COURT: You were disputing it. But I am 
prepared now to go ahead with sentencing. We have had the 
hearing set and no one followed up on it. And so we are going] 
to go ahead with it. 
MS. ROBLEY: That wasn't my fault. 
51 
THE COURT: Well, I also--I also want to make clear 
for the record that I am relying on the pre-sentence report tc 
a certain degree. I am also relying primarily on your prior 
DUI record in sentencing you. Now I think probably the 
harshness of the sentence, in terms of recommending no good 
time and that type of thing, no statutory good time, may be 
going--they may have been relying on some of the things they 
heard. I am not inclined necessarily to impose that. 
However, I think the other part of the recommendation is 
justified solely on the basis of your record. 
Anything from the State? You indicated you wanted to 
say something? 
MS. SJOGREN: I just wanted to say for the record, 
your Honor, the witnesses that were here earlier were 
witnesses subpoenaed by the State, and they were the State's 
witnesses that were present here. 
THE COURT: And it didn't seem fair to me that they 
should have to sit and wait and wait and wait. 
MS. SJOGREN: I agree. I just wanted to make the 
record clear in case the Defendant--
THE COURT: This was continued from last week on a 
special setting and no follow up. 
MR. MILES: Apparently witnesses are here on 
Preliminary Hearing. Both of them are in custody. Would you 
give Mr. Boyle a chance to speak with her about the 
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sentencing? I understand the Court is considered to have its 
mind made up, but obviously she is entitled to some 
representation. We haven't had a chance to review it. If Mr. 
Caine was supposed to be coming over here, he is not, so she 
ought to obviously have the benefit of having an attorney 
review that and address the court. 
MR. BOYLE: I was trying to get ahold of Mr. Caine 
to see if he was coming over here. 
MR. MILES: He indicated he wasn't. So we need an 
opportunity to speak with her. With both of them being in 
custody, could we hold the Preliminary Hearing? 
THE COURT: How many more do we have to do? 
THE CLERK: That's it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is the other person in custody? 
MR. MILES: He is. 
THE COURT: And that's the only other thing? 
THE CLERK: Other than the affidavits. That would 
be it. 
THE COURT: All right. All right. 
(Case continued.) 
THE CLERK: 
Robley, 95001647. 
THE COURT: 
somewhat, Mr. Boyle. 
Recall the State of Utah vs. Cynthia 
I know I am putting you on the spot 
I don't mean to. I don't think the 
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record will reflect that this is something that you were 
supposed to be here on in terms of sentencing hearing. 
MR. BOYLE: I don't have any problem. I have had a 
chance to talk with her on this. I am not sure what happened 
II with the witnesses and all that. 
THE COURT: Well, I know what happened. They were 
here. And in fact I think even the State brought them in. I 
|| excused some of them because there was--it had been set at 
1:30 for this hearing. 
MS. SJOGREN: Everyone was here but the attorney. 
THE COURT: Apparently so. No else was here to 
handle it. And I wasn't going to make all these people wait 
when I called it specially at 1:30. And I am ready to go 
ahead. 
MR. BOYLE: Okay. I have had a chance to talk with 
her about this. What we would like to do, she has currently 
served almost six months in jail. 
THE COURT: Not on this case. 
MR. BOYLE: No, not on this case. It was on the 
Weber County case in front of Judge Storey. And it wasn't a 
straight six months. She was in and came back out. And now 
she is back in. 
What we would ask the Court to do in this case--and we 
are clearly aware of her DUI record. What I think would 
probably be in her best interests, as well as I think 
8 
society's, is for her to serve the six months under the Weber 
County case, which is the 14th. Have this case run concurrent] 
with that, so that she will basically be given six month's 
credit. And then she would have to serve out an additional 
six months on this case. 
Now, in addition to that, what I would like to do is, she) 
has had some conversation with a friend through Serenity 
House. It appears it is a little bit better for circumstances] 
for women as opposed to men. It doesn't seem like it is 
taking them as long to place them in a bed. What it appears 
is she could probably get a bed within a month and a half or 
two months. We ask that this case run concurrent with Judge 
Storey's. She have an additional six months sentence. We ask] 
the Court to hold her in jail until a bed in Serenity house 
becomes available, hopefully that will be a month and a half 
or two months. Then she would have to do a 90 day in patient 
treatment program. And then she is out on parole under the 
terms of probation. 
That pretty much--all together she would serve a year in 
all, albeit she would also be serving it under Judge Storey's 
case as well. I think that would be enough to get her 
attention, modify her behavior, as well as provide kind of--
what we need after all of this is a treatment program to 
address the issue of her alcohol consumption. 
THE COURT: Mr. Daines, do you have any input on 
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this? 
MR. DAINES: Sorry, I don't, your Honor. I don't 
know anything about this case. It would be unfair for me to 
talk about it. 
THE COURT: Well, I think perhaps the recommendation! 
that there be given no statutory good time in this case, and 
no community release, which I agree with, is one thing, but I 
think that may be carrying it somewhat far. I have got very 
serious question as to whether treatment is really something 
that's really going to be of much value in this case to be 
quite honest, given the report and given what's been stated. 
And given the history, I just don't see that there is any--it 
doesn't mean that you can't stop drinking and driving. That's] 
what I am really concerned about here. I am far less 
concerned about the drinking problem than I am with the fact 
of the chronic getting in the car. It doesn't take much--
MS. ROBLEY: At this point in time--
THE COURT: It doesn't take much to stay out of the 
car when you have been drinking, unless you are so out of 
control that you can't make a judgment on it, in which case 
you should be incarcerated. 
That's the problem here. I will let you make a 
statement. I did not allow you to do that before. I got 
short circuited by the request for sentencing hearing so you 
didn't get to make a statement. I will let you make a 
10I 
statement. I think you see where I am coming from. 
Go ahead. 
MS. ROBLEY: My own thoughts, your Honor, the only 
alcohol treatment program I have ever had was through Weber 
County DNA, which was not extensive. And because of 
medications I was being prescribed for osteoporosis and high 
blood pressure and that, at that time I could not take 
antibuse because it basically threw my blood pressure into a 
tizzy, as well as everything else in my system. I have never 
had any kind of treatment program other than the basic one DNA| 
does provide, which is basically informational and open 
discussion. And I did complete those. The only problem I had| 
was economically. 
THE COURT: What about Clinical Consultants? 
MS. ROBLEY: Clinical Consultants, I could not 
continue with because I had to make payments up front. And at| 
that point in time I was fighting my Social Security, and I 
did not have it. 
And my husband at the time was not working because he had] 
to have a colostomy. So we were just barely surviving. 
THE COURT: In May of '96 Judge Storey ordered you 
to complete an in patient drug treatment program. 
MS. ROBLEY: Correct. 
THE COURT: Why didn't you do that? 
MS. ROBLEY: Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hoover, who I 
HI 
was engaged to, was hit by a vehicle. Mr. Storey was kind 
enough to give me extensions until we got Gary out of the 
hospital. Within not even four months after he was released 
from the hospital, he passed away. As a matter of fact, that 
was a month after my arrest on March 15th on this new DUI. 
THE COURT: So you have had lots of opportunities, 
but you just haven't been able to manage to get away and find 
time to do it, is that it? 
MS. ROBLEY: That as well as the financing, that is 
correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why would this be any different then? 
MS. ROBLEY: I do have the monies available at this 
point in time through a family friend to help me go ahead and 
get into a treatment program and get this dealt with at my 
request. And to my knowledge she stated also if it was Court 
Ordered, the money still stood. 
And I also want to try antibuse, because at this point in| 
time I have quit taking all my medications. 
THE COURT: Well, I think the recommendation is a 
fair one. I think that it doesn't preclude anyone, after they] 
serve their jail time, from going out and getting help for 
themselves, which I think you should do. Really it is 
probably the best form when you decide that you really do want| 
it. I don't think telling you is going to make any 
difference. I really don't. I don't think that it works very) 
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well. We could do it. We try to do it. But it doesn't 
necessarily constitute--
MS. ROBLEY: I don't drink to get drunk. I drink 
because I enjoy the taste. 
THE COURT: To be quite honest, I don't care if you 
drink or not. You can drink until, you know, you can't see, 
you know, if that really is what you want to do. But I don't 
think you really want to do that. But if you do want to do 
it, I don't have a problem with that. 
But your driving when you are drinking, you constitute a 
danger to the community. That's what we are here to address. 
I will sentence you to a year in the County Jail. It 
will not run concurrent with the other case. These are 
separate offenses, and it would be, I think, a joke really to 
run it concurrent. 
I will, however, not limit you to no statutory good time. 
I don't have a problem with them giving you statutory good 
time. However, I will indicate in this there is no consensual 
decree release or no community release early from your 
sentence, other than giving you statutory good time, because 
of the nature of the offense. And frankly I think this may 
have been able to be charged as a felony possibly. And so 
that's where we are at with it. And that's what we are going 
to do. 
MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, can she be--if she is going 
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to do the one year, can she do that in prison? 
THE COURT: Not if she is given statutory good time 
That puts it at nine months. Most of them get it, don't they?| 
It is not a year. 
MR. BOYLE: Pretty much guaranteed at Weber County 
Jail. But my understanding of the statute is if she is 
sentenced to one year, she can elect to serve it down at the 
Prison. 
THE COURT: I don't think she can elect to do it if 
it is statutory good time. It is less than a year. That's 
what she has been given, so--if I would--if she elects to do 
that, she will spend her one year at the State Prison. I 
think I can order her to do that and she won't be given 
statutory good time, if that's what she wants to do. But I 
don't know if they will accept her under those conditions. 
But frankly I want to see some statutory authority if I 
give her statutory good time, as I just did. It wasn't in 
response to a request for that. But she is looking at doing 
nine months. I don't think that qualifies for release down 
there. 
MS. ROBLEY: I don't have a problem with a 15 months] 
sentence right now, and appeal it. 
THE COURT: Anyway, if you want to file a brief, I 
will take a look at it. Other than that, I am not going to 
just do it. 
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